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Saved Face, Defended Place  
Arthur Schnitzler’s Posture of Detachment and the Codes of Cool Conduct 
 
In his seminal study, Cool Conduct: The Culture of Distance in Weimar Germany (2000, 
German original 1994), Helmut Lethen describes how the experience of defeat in 
Germany and Austria after the First World War led to the formulation of behavioural 
codes of cultivated distance that were supposed to contain antagonistic tensions and 
promote a peaceful coexistence in a society whose traditional value system had been 
thoroughly destabilized.1 The philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner and his 
1924 study The Limits of Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism form a central 
theoretical backdrop for Lethen’s analysis.2 He shows that this anthropology of distance 
also informed the aesthetic production of the Weimar Republic, inspiring the ‘New 
Objectivity’ of literary and visual culture in the 1920s.  
Lethen remarks that Plessner’s study breaks with the conventions of the Expressionist 
cult of authenticity by retrieving elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy and of turn-of-the-
century aestheticism: ‘we may conclude either that that aestheticism fundamentally 
penetrates the existential conditions of modernity or that a major work of philosophical 
 
1 Helmut Lethen, Cool Conduct: The Culture of Distance in Weimar Germany, trans. by 
Don Reneau (Berkeley CA/London, 2002). 
2 Helmuth Plessner, The Limits of Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism, trans. by 
Andrew Wallace (New York, 1999). 
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anthropology in the 1920s still unconsciously observes fin-de-siècle convention’.3 Taking 
its cue from Lethen, this essay aims to examine where the work of Viennese Modernist 
Arthur Schnitzler can be placed with regard to this connection between turn-of-the-
century culture and Plessner’s anthropology of the interwar years. It will be argued that 
Schnitzler can indeed count to some extent as a, perhaps unlikely, forerunner of the cool 
conduct codes promoted in Plessner’s study. I hope to show that what I want to call 
Schnitzler’s authorial posture in the literary field is informed by an anthropology of 
detachment which shares central aspects with that of Plessner. 
The Swiss literary scholar Jérôme Meizoz defines an authorial posture, taking his cue 
from Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of the literary field, as a unique manner of occupying a 
position in a field. It is a personal mode of accepting or holding a role or a status: an 
author gambles or fights for their position in the literary field through different forms of 
representation of themselves and of their postures.4 The main difference between the term 
posture and what is generally referred to as authorial self-fashioning is that posture 
includes, but goes beyond the intentional forms of self-styling and conscious strategies of 
authorial position-taking.5 As the analysis of an authorial posture asks how the way an 
 
3 Lethen, Cool Conduct, p. 63. 
4 See Jerôme Meizoz, ‘Die posture und das literarische Feld’, Text und Feld. Bourdieu in 
literaturwissenschaftlicher Praxis, ed. by Markus Joch and Norbert Christian Wolf 
(Tübingen,  2005), pp. 177–188 (p. 177). 
5 See also Clemens Peck and Norbert Wolf, ‘Poetologien des Posturalen 1918–1933/38: 
Einleitung’, in Poetologien des Posturalen: Autorschaftsinszenierungen in der Literatur 
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author places themselves through literary texts relates to their other forms of position 
taking, it allows me to explore how Schnitzler’s own public display of detachment in the 
literary field corresponds to the anthropology of detachment developed in his literary and 
aphoristic writings. While we will see that this anthropology often resonates rather 
strongly with Plessner’s ideal of cultivated distance in the public sphere, it will become 
clear that Schnitzler’s perspective, particularly in his literary writings, contains elements 
that are decidedly critical of the potential risks that this ideal, if taken to an extreme, may 
entail. The more biographically oriented analysis in the first part of the essay will show 
that Schnitzler’s own cultivation of a detached posture, while cognate with Plesser’s 
conceptions of cultivated distance, is to a considerable extent informed by the fact that 
his positionality as a Jew often placed him in a rather precarious location in the German-




In The Limits of Community, Plessner describes the public sphere as an antagonistic 
space, in which everyone is striving for recognition, but is terrified of shame. Making 
oneself seen without exposing oneself is the difficult balance to be maintained. Therefore, 
the individual has to protect his dignity (for Plessner, the public sphere appears to be an 
entirely male domain) by armouring himself through the adoption of a public persona: 
 
der Zwischenkriegszeit, ed. by Clemens Peck and Norbert Wolf (Paderborn, 2017), pp. 9–
25. 
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‘The individual at first must give himself a form that makes him unassailable, an armor 
that he can wear entering the battlefield of the public sphere’.6 Plessner modifies the 
militaristic metaphor of the armour by adding the theatrical metaphors of mask and role-
play. For Plessner, any attempt at authentic expression creates a moment of extreme 
vulnerability. He recognizes an ‘intrinsically inscrutable ridiculousness of all uninhibited 
expression of emotion, indeed of all pronouncements of psychological being in general’.7 
This public mask thus protects the individual from the embarrassment of such 
pronouncements and allows for a less immediate and more detached social intercourse in 
the public sphere.  
The need to protect oneself through detachment becomes particularly relevant when 
one’s dignity in the public sphere is under explicit attack.  Plessner’s idea of an 
antagonistic social space in which the individual has to protect himself through an armour 
or mask resonates, therefore, with Schnitzler’s own experience as a Jewish author in the 
German-language literary field at the beginning of the twentieth century where his 
legitimate place as representative of German and Austrian culture was constantly 
challenged. Schnitzler highlights the ‘seelisch[e] fast noch mehr als politisch[e] und 
sozial[e] Bedeutung’ [psychological, almost more than political and social significance] 
of the public omnipresence of the so-called Judenfrage or Jewish question and writes that 
is was impossible for a Jewish person, ‘insbesondere für einen Juden, der in der 
Öffentlichkeit stand, davon abzusehen, dass er Jude war, da die anderen es nicht taten, die 
Christen nicht und die Juden noch weniger’ [in particular for a Jew who was a public 
 
6 Plessner, Limits of Community, p. 133. 
7 Ibid., p. 118. 
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figure, to ignore the fact that he was a Jew, because the others did not ignore it, not the 
Christians, and the Jews even less so].8 Schnitzler reacted to this coerced placement with 
what I am calling a posture of detachment.  
In a letter to the Neue Rundschau of 1915, Schnitzler writes pointedly: 
Die systematische halb oberflächliche, halb böswillige Verfälschung 
meiner literarischen Physiognomie […] schleicht sich natürlich auch 
schon in die Literaturgeschichten ein, […] die ja zum grössten Teil von 
verschämten oder unverschämten Klerikalen und Antisemiten geschrieben 
werden. 
[Of course, the systematic, half superficial, half malicious, distortion of 
my literary physiognomy has now also crept into our literary histories 
which are mainly written by shameful or shameless clericals and 
antisemites.] 9 
It is striking that Schnitzler uses the unusual term ‘literary physiognomy’ instead of, for 
example, authorial ‘portrait’. Physiognomy seems to refer to less laudatory forms of 
 
8 Arthur Schnitzler, Jugend in Wien. Eine Autobiographie, ed. by Therese Nickl and 
Heinrich Schnitzler (Vienna, Munich and Zurich, 1968), p. 328. Henceforth references 
are given in parentheses in the body of the text, as JW, followed by the page number(s). 
Unless indicated otherwise, all translations are my own. 
9 Arthur Schnitzler Papers, Cambridge University Library (henceforth CUL), A20, 3.  
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representation and particularly to the invocation of antisemitic stereotypes.10 Drawing 
upon Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical concept of identity, Ritchie Robertson has 
highlighted how self-representation and performance of the self are constantly made 
difficult for stigmatized groups such as the Jews in the increasingly antisemitic Austrian 
society of the early twentieth century.11  Schnitzler’s expression of literary physiognomy 
seems to exemplify this paradigmatically. Moreover, it brings to mind another 
Goffmanian notion, that is, the so-called ‘facework’ of social interaction: according to the 
sociologist, ‘saving face’ designates the way we construct and protect our public self-
image against threats.12 The antisemitic distortions of his literary physiognomy have to be 
 
10 I follow the recommendation of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance to 
use the un-hyphenated spelling of ‘antisemitism’ as opposed to the more frequently used 
‘anti-Semitism’, ‘in order to dispel the idea that there is an entity “Semitism” which 
“anti-Semitism” opposes. Antisemitism should be read as a unified term so that the 
meaning of the generic term for modern Jew-hatred is clear.’ See International Holocaust 
Remembrance Alliance, ‘Memo on Spelling Antisemitism’ , April 2015: 
https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/sites/default/files/memo-on-spelling-of-
antisemitism_final-1.pdf.  
11 Ritchie Robertson, ‘Jewish Self-Hatred? The Cases of Schnitzler and Canetti’, in 
Austrians and Jews in the Twentieth Century: From Franz Joseph to Waldheim, ed. by 
Robert S. Wistrich (Basingstoke, 1992), pp. 82–86. 
12 Erving Goffman,  ‘On Face-Work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social 
Interaction’, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Garden City/New 
York, 1967), pp. 5–45. 
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precisely understood as such threats against his face in the Goffmanian sense. And this 
practice of saving one’s public face appears to be intimately coherent with the protective 
mask and armour which Plessner claims to be a necessary element of social interactions 
in the antagonism of the public sphere.  
As a posture is a form of authorial self-representation in order to – intentionally or not – 
claim and defend a position in the literary field, I understand Schnitzler’s posture of 
detachment as a form of distancing practice, linked to his need to maintain a ‘face-
saving’ mask in the public sphere of the literary field. The constant confrontation with 
more or less explicit antisemitic attacks throughout his life and writing career made it 
particularly necessary for him to protect his own face, as expressed in the metaphor of 
literary physiognomy. The unpublished folder ‘In eigener Sache’ [In my own case] in 
which the letter quoted above is contained is a collection of letters and private comments 
on passages from the press, in which Schnitzler sees himself attacked or misrepresented. 
It is interesting in this context that these often unpublished commentaries seem to have 
the function of protecting Schnitzler’s public face, not by publically setting things right, 
but by giving him a channel for his anger, which will remain unseen: ‘Der Sinn dieser 
Worte soll vorläufig kein anderer sein als durch rasche Abreaktion die Seele für reinere 
und wertvollere Regungen wieder frei zu machen.’ [In the first instance, these words are 
supposed to function as a swift way to let off steam in order to free the soul for purer and 
more valuable emotions.] (CUL A20, 8) 
Rather than engaging in heated confrontational exchanges with the antisemitic press, 




anger is here not seen as a fitting response to injury, but as something ‘impure’, or at least 
counter-productive, an emotion that needs to be contained. This is reminiscent of the way 
Plessner understands the display of authentic emotions as always potentially 
embarrassing and a sign of vulnerability. Schnitzler seems to protect himself from such 
embarrassment by hiding his anger from the public. 
In his letter to the Neue Rundschschau, Schnitzler also adds that he has heard some of the 
stigmatizing and stereotyping misrepresentations often enough ‘um endlich stumpf 
dagegen zu werden’ [to have finally become indifferent to them].13 He thus claims to 
have become able to detach himself from these hurtful attacks. How hard it is to maintain 
this form of detachment in an increasingly antisemitic society, however, Schnitzler 
describes in the often-cited autobiographical note on the Judenfrage mentioned earlier. 
Here, he highlights that it was impossible for any Jewish person to remain unaffected by 
the contemporary discussions of the so-called Jewish question:  
Und auch wenn man seine innere und äußere Haltung […] bewahrte, […], 
ganz unberührt bleiben war so unmöglich, als etwa ein Mensch aber mit 
wachen Augen zusehen muß, wie unreine Messer sie ritzen, ja schneiden, 
bis das Blut kommt. 
[And even if one retained one’s inner and outer posture […], staying 
completely unaffected was as impossible as it would be for a man to 
remain indifferent, if – even having had his skin anaesthetized – he had to 
 
13 CUL A20,3. 
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watch dirty knives scoring, indeed cutting into it, until the blood flows.] 
(JW, 329).  
Schnitzler uses the metaphoric image of a body that is cut open and made vulnerable to 
infection to describe the constant strain of antisemitic attacks. In her study Strange 
Encounters (2000), Sara Ahmed writes about how the idea of bodily integrity is related to 
the privilege of being racially unmarked: ‘The unmarked body is the body that appears 
contained, enclosed, and separate’.14 Schnitzler’s passage seems to describe how 
antisemitism marks the Jewish body as ‘other’ and therefore does injury to the boundaries 
that make sure it remains ‘contained, enclosed, and separate’. ‘Haltung bewahren’ 
[retaining posture/bearing], significantly, means remaining in control of one’s body, 
confining it to the rigid lines of a socially prescribed posture, keeping it contained. It is 
also a military term which resonates with Plessner’s idea of donning armour. ‘Innere 
Haltung’ [internal posture] refers to control over emotions, which in turn can affect also 
physical composure or the ‘äußere Haltung’ [external posture]. In view of the quotation 
from the letter to the Neue Rundschau, both are also important for Schnitzler’s authorial 
posture as a means to defend his place in the literary field.  
Schnitzler highlights both the struggle to retain one’s posture in the face of antisemitism 
and the impossibility of remaining completely detached, that is ‘unberührt’ [unaffected], 
which might be rendered as ‘untouched’, and ‘gleichgültig’ [indifferent]. It appears here 
that detachment from one’s emotions (staying ‘gleichgültig’) – in combination with 
 
14 Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (London: 
2000), p. 43 
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retaining one’s posture – is seen as closely linked to retaining one’s dignity, which 
corresponds to Plessner’s emphasis on the prevention of embarrassment through exposure 
of one’s emotions. In The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004), Ahmed points out that 
‘emotions are bound up with the securing of social hierarchy: emotions become attributes 
of bodies as a way of transforming what is ‘lower’ or ‘higher’ into bodily traits’, meaning 
that the uncontrolled display of certain emotions is used as a symptom to designate ‘the 
other’.15 In her discussion of the correlation between emotions and marginalization, 
Ahmed quotes Darwin, who remarked that certain bodily signs of emotions are primal 
remnants of a time when ‘man once existed in a much lower and animal-like condition’.16 
Being able to control one’s emotions is thus seen as a sign of evolutionary progress. 
Schnitzler’s description of ‘purer and more valuable emotions’ seems to suggest that his 
own perspective on anger is coloured by this hierarchical coding of emotions. This 
means, however, that if people who belong to groups already marked as ‘other’ do 
display rage or a loss of posture they will be punished with further ‘othering’. While 
Plessner’s study does not take such asymmetrical power structures into account, 
Schnitzler’s case demonstrates that the need to mask one’s emotions depends to a large 










The operation of ‘othering’ often takes the form of insulting, injurious speech acts. Judith 
Butler writes, ‘[t]o be injured by speech is to suffer a loss of context, that is, not to know 
where you are’.17 Being ‘othered’ in this way is thus intimately linked with a 
destabilization of one’s sense of place:  ‘Exposed at the moment of such shattering is 
precisely the volatility of one’s “place” within the community of speakers; one can be 
“put in one’s place” by such speech, but such a place may be no place’.18 Saving one’s 
face and retaining one’s posture against attacks of ‘othering’ therefore also means 
defending one’s place within the community of speakers.  
A passage in Schnitzler’s novel Der Weg ins Freie [The Path into the Open (1908)] 
shows this mechanism through the example of the Berthold Stauber, a young Jewish 
physician with at least originally ambitious political aspirations. However, he decides to 
terminate his political career after an incident in parliament where his opponents use 
antisemitic slurs to silence him. In the context of a political parliament discussion, these 
insults have precisely the effect described by Butler: they take Berthold out of the context 
of the parliamentary discussion because they are not at all related to the content of his 
own speech but deny him his right to be heard out and taken seriously as a politician in 
the arena of political speech. The antisemitic insult sends Bertold off the political stage to 
 
17 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, New York, London 
1997, p. 40. 
18 Ibid., p. 4. 
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an uncertain non-place outside of the community of speakers, assigning him the position 
of the ‘other’. 
Significantly, when he recounts the event to his non-Jewish acquaintances, the novel’s 
protagonist Georg, his lover Anna and her family, their reaction shows that they are not 
prepared to accept and support him in his anger. Berthold shows his outrage by imitating 
his aggressors:  
“Ruhig, Jud! Halts Maul! Jud! Jud! Kusch!” fuhr Berthold fort und schien in 
Erinnerung zu schwelgen.  
Anna sah vor sich hin. Georg fand innerlich, es wäre nun genug. Ein kurzes, 
peinliches Schweigen entstand  
[“Quiet, Jew! Shut your gob! Jew! Jew! Down boy!” continued Berthold, who 
seemed to wallow in the memory. Anna just looked ahead. Georg’s feeling was 
that this was quite enough. There was a short, embarrassed silence].19  
Anna’s father then utters the assumption that Berthold is ‘über diese rohen Insulte gewiß 
erhaben’ [of course, above such crude insults] (E, 1, 657). It is clear that this comment 
and the embarrassed silence following Berthold’s outburst reflect the expectation that 
Berthold should retain his posture and not express his righteous anger.  
This is further underlined when Berthold recounts a scene at the buffet reception 
following the insults in the parliamentary session, where one of his most outspoken 
 
19 Arthur Schnitzler, Die Erzählenden Schriften, 2 vols (Frankfurt a.M., 1961), I, 657. 
Henceforth references to this edition are given in parentheses in the body of the text, as E, 
followed by volume number and page number(s). 
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aggressors greets him as if nothing had happened. The possibility that the way he treated 
Berthold in parliament might actually have consequences, that he might be met with 
anger and resistance also off the political stage does not even occur to him. For Anna, 
however, this does not seem to warrant a reaction as strong as Berthold’s resignation: she 
teases him for his decision ‘mit leisem Spott’ [with gentle mockery] (E, 1, 657). 
Confronted with such a lack of empathy, Berthold masks his susceptibility to hurt with a 
smile, albeit betrayed by a physiognomic tic: ‘Berthold lächelte. Zugleich aber zuckte es 
um seine Brauen wie gewöhnlich, wenn er unangenehm oder schmerzlich berührt war’ 
[Berthold smiled. But at the same time there was a twitching round his eye-brows, as was 
usual when he felt unpleasantly or painfully affected/touched] (E, 1, 657–58). Having 
been thus ‘touched’, he assumes, retrospectively, a posture of detachment, so to speak:  
“Sie haben ja wahrscheinlich recht, Fräulein Anna,” sagte er, “wenn Sie darüber 
lächeln, daß ich wegen dieses läppischen Abenteuers mein Mandat niedergelegt 
habe. Ein parlamentarisches Leben ohne Komödienspiel ist ja überhaupt nicht 
möglich.” 
[“You are probably right, Fräulein Anna”, he said, “if you smile at me resigning 
my seat because of that silly adventure. But then, a parliamentary life without 
comic theatre is quite impossible.] (E, 1, 659) 
In order to describe the inauthenticity of parliamentary politics Berthold uses the notion 
‘Komödienspiel’, which appears with great frequency in Schnitzler’s work and often 
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seems to refer to the inauthenticity and insincerity of politics.20 This evaluation seems to 
differ significantly from Plessner’s ideal of social role-play that is aimed at avoiding 
social conflict.  
In contrast to Plessner’s study, the passage in Schnitzler’s novel makes the asymmetrical 
power structures residing in the public sphere explicit: the specific role assigned to 
Berthold is considerably more restrictive than others. Berthold recognises that social 
interactions both in- and outside parliament follow a certain script and that his authentic 
reaction of being personally offended by the antisemitic insults thrown at him only leads 
to further derision. By calling the incident ‘läppisch’ [silly], he at least retrospectively 
assumes the role that everyone around him seems to expect him to play: someone who is 
able to rise above the insults and retains his posture. The passage exposes the vicious 
circle inherent to the practice of ‘othering’: showing outrage and thus losing one’s 
 
20 See also the following aphorism: ‘Machen wir uns nicht mitschuldig an der 
Lügenhaftigkeit der Welt, insbesondere am Komödienspiel der Politik, wenn wir uns 
immer wieder anstellen, als hätten wir innere Ansichten, Überzeugungen, Ideen zu 
bekämpfen, da wir doch wissen, daß uns nur Parteiinteresse, Gedankenlosigkeit und 
Bosheit gegenüber stehen’ [Do we not become complicit in the falsehood of the world, 
particularly in the comic theatre of politics, if we pretend time and again that we have to 
fight inner opinions, convictions, ideas, even though we know that we are just confronted 
with party interest, thoughtlessness, and malice]. Arthur Schnitzler, Aphorismen und 
Betrachtungen, ed. by Robert O. Weiss (Frankfurt a.M., 1967), p. 239. Henceforth 
references are given in parentheses in the body of the text, as AB, followed by the page 
number(s). 
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posture in the face of discriminatory speech only perpetuates its very effect by seemingly 
confirming already existing stereotypes of the ‘other’. After all, the body that is perhaps 
most remarkable in its inability to remain in a socially acceptable posture is that of the 
hysteric. And the allegation that both women and Jews had a particularly high tendency 
to develop nervous or hysterical symptoms, thus to not be able to contain one’s inner and 
outer posture, formed a central part of the respective stereotypes.21 Labelling someone as 
‘hysterical’ or ‘over-sensitive’ is thus an effective strategy to silence them and to put 
them back into their ‘place’ if they dare to protest against the initial ‘othering’ they have 
received.  In turn, being in control of one’s posture and emotions appears as a defence 
strategy against ‘othering’. Berthold’s smile thus becomes a mask of detachment 
protecting his ‘face’ against further injury.  
As we have seen above, this is mirrored in Schnitzler’s own attempts at retaining his 
posture of detachment when confronted with antisemitic aggression. Schnitzler’s 
cultivation of cool conduct codes is in the first instance not the deliberate embodiment of 
an ideal of cultivated distance, but emerges from his marginalized placement in the 
literary field. However, as we will see in the following, to some extent, Schnitzler seems 
to share Plessner’s view that Komödienspiel forms an elemental part of the human 
condition and that a certain amount of regulated distance could be indeed desirable for 
the relaxation of social tensions. At the same time, Schnitzler’s work anticipates critically 
the risks inherent in a society that relies completely on cool conduct codes for its 
regulation of interpersonal intercourse. 
 
 




For Plessner, social role-play and masking are not forms of alienation, but part and parcel 
of the human condition, as he claims that man is artificial by nature.22 Lethen points out 
that this understanding of the social role takes its cue from Nietzsche’s paradox ‘only 
masked is a man entirely real’.23 In one of his aphorisms, Schnitzler expresses a similar 
idea: 
Manche Menschen erscheinen uns so widerspruchsvoll, weil wir in ihrer 
Betrachtung und Beurteilung das Element des Komödienspiels zum Teil 
oder ganz vernachlässigen, welches doch bei jedem Menschen, nicht nur 
bei den sogenannten Komödianten, Lügnern, Poseuren usw. in 
irgendeinem,  wenn auch bescheidenen Maße vorhanden ist. Es ist 
sozusagen eine physiologische Beimischung des Elements Lüge auch in 
dem wahrsten Individuum, und wäre es auch nur als Geltungs- oder 
Spieltrieb. 
[Some persons appear to us to be so full of contradictions because when 
we observe and judge them we partly or completely neglect the element of 
comic role-play, which exists, to however modest a degree, in every 
 
22 Helmuth Plessner, ‘Macht und menschliche Natur: Ein Versuch zur Anthropologie der 
geschichtlichen Weltansicht’ (1931), in Gesammelte Schriften, 10 vols. (Frankfurt a.M., 
1982), V, p. 199. See also Lethen, Cool Conduct, p. 53. 
23 Lethen, Cool Conduct, p. 63. 
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individual and not only in the so-called comedians, liars, poseurs etc. […].  
Even in the most authentic individual, we detect, so to speak, a 
physiological admixture of the element of lying, and be it only due to the 
drive for social recognition or play.] (AB, 285) 
The notion of Komödienspiel appears here in a different light than in the passage in 
Schnitzler’s novel discussed in the previous section. If an element of Komödienspiel 
exists in all of us, as Schnitzler writes, then it is to be understood less as a moralistic 
deficiency and more as an anthropological fact. This is underscored by the almost bio-
medical terminology in this passage: if a certain amount of inauthenticity is part of our 
physiology, if playfulness is in fact a ‘drive’, then Schnitzler’s anthropological 
conceptualization of role-play corresponds to Plessner’s dictum that man is by nature 
artificial. Moreover, Schnitzler’s expression of the so-called Geltungstrieb, the drive or 
instinct for social recognition, resonates with Plessner’s idea of the public sphere in 
which individuals strive for recognition and avoid the embarrassment of revealing 
themselves completely.  
For Schnitzler, in a similar way as for Plessner, this social Komödienspiel forms part of 
how one places oneself more or less effectively in the public sphere while avoiding 
conflict and confrontation: ‘Nicht jedes Lügen ist eben auch ein Anlügen. Es kann 
Affektation, Pose, auch Höflichkeit sein’ [Not every act of lying implies lying to 
someone. It can also be affectation, posing, but also politeness] (AB, 285). In particular 
the last aspect, politeness, is compatible with Plessner’s idea of tactful social role-play 
that maintains a respectful distance between individuals: 
 18 
the virtuous mastery of forms of play where persons come close to each 
other without meeting […]. The offensive indifference, coldness, and 
rudeness of living past each other is made ineffective through forms of 
politeness, respectfulness, and attentiveness. Reserve counteracts a too 
great intimacy.24 
Plessner’s advocacy of cultivated distance could have resonated with Schnitzler’s own 
evaluation of potential conflict in in the public sphere. In 1927, thus after Plessner 
published his study, Schnitzler writes: 
Es ist immer noch besser, wenn sich zwei Menschen über den Abgrund 
ewiger Fremdheit hin kühl die Hände reichen, als wenn sie einander über 
den trügerischen Wirbeln des Verstehens gerührt in die Arme sinken. 
[It is always better, when two people, divided by an abyss of eternal 
estrangement, offer each other a cool handshake, rather than fall into one 
another’s arms in a deceitful whirl of understanding.] (AB, 63) 
A tactful distance that is respectful of the difference between two individuals is thus 
preferable to a false sense of intimacy that ignores the incommensurability of the other’s 
difference.  
The image of the cool handshake over the abyss already appears at the end of Schnitzler’s 
play Professor Bernhardi (1912), where the doctor and his adversary, the priest, enact 
 
24 Plessner, Limits of Community, p. 131. 
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precisely this scenario.25 When the priest offers Bernhardi his hand after having triggered 
an antisemitic smear campaign against the Jewish doctor, the latter smiles: ‘Über – den 
Abgrund, Hochwürden?’ (Over – the abyss, Reverend?’).26  In view of Schnitzler’s own 
experience with antisemitic aggression, his sympathy for established boundaries may not 
be surprising.  Schnitzler’s posture of detachment has to be understood as a defence 
against transgressive antisemitic attacks that precisely do not respect him as occupying a 
legitimate place in the literary field (or, in Berthold’s case, in parliament). Conduct codes 
that regulate the maintenance of respectful distance in the public sphere may promise 
much needed protection from precisely such violation of boundaries, as long as they 
apply to everyone. If Plessner’s ideal of social role-play in the public sphere is based on 
tact, which can be defined as ‘respect for the space of the other’,27 then this responds to a 
need for everyone to respect the place of one another and to not violate the other through 
transgression. While, according to Lethen, this need emerged more generally in the 
German society after WWI as a reaction to the collective humiliation of defeat, it may be 
 
25 See Verena Vortisch,  An der Grenze des Poesielandes: Arthur Schnitzlers Komödie 
Fink und Fliederbusch (Würzburg, 2014), p. 90. 
26 Arthur Schnitzler, Die Dramatischen Werke, 2 vols (Frankfurt a.M., 1962), 2, 436. 
Henceforth references to this edition are given in parentheses in the body of the text, as 
D, followed by volume number and page number(s). 
27 Katja Haustein, ‘How to Be Alone With Others: Plessner, Adorno, and Barthes on 
Tact’, MLR 114.1 (2019), 1–21 (p. 3).  
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plausible that it was felt well before then by someone like Schnitzler who had to defend 
his place and save his public ‘face’ from antisemitic ‘disfigurement’ on a regular basis. 
 
IV 
Schnitzler’s apparent sympathy for codes of cool conduct in the public sphere avant la 
lettre, however, does not mean that his work idealizes the detachment of social role-play 
as a general lifestyle. Far from endorsing or participating in the aestheticist tendencies 
that, according to Lethen, gave inspiration to the development of cool conduct codes in 
the 1920s, Schnitzler’s work seems to suggest that if the need to keep one’s protective 
mask in place through social Komödienspiel becomes the primary concern above 
anything else this will have problematic consequences for interpersonal relationships. In 
one of his better-known aphorisms, Schnitzler introduces the term ‘Kernlosigkeit’ 
[carelessness], which he describes as a common psychical constitution of the modern 
person:  
Die Seele mancher Menschen scheint aus einzelnen gewissermaßen 
flottierenden Elementen zu bestehen, die sich niemals um ein Zentrum zu 
gruppieren, also auch keine Einheit zu bilden imstande sind. So lebt der 
kernlose Mensch in einer ungeheuren und ihm doch niemals völlig zu 
Bewußtsein kommenden Einsamkeit dahin. Die große Mehrzahl der 
Menschen ist überhaupt in diesem Sinne kernlos, doch erst an 
merkwürdigen oder bedeutenden Menschen fällt uns solche Kernlosigkeit 
auf, die übrigens vorzugsweise bei reproduzierenden Talenten, vor allem 
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bei genialen Schauspielern, insbesondere Schauspielerinnen, zu beobachen 
ist.  
[Some people’s souls appear to consist of separate and, as it were, floating 
elements, which never settle around a centre, and as such can never build a 
unity. The coreless person thus lives in a terrible loneliness, although he is 
never fully conscious of it. The large majority of people are coreless in 
this sense, but we notice this corelessness only in noteworthy and 
prominent people, which, incidentally, you can observe in particular in 
people who are talented in the performing arts, above all in actors of 
genius, and actresses in particular.] (AB, 53–54)  
Horst Thomé has pointed out that since Schnitzler speaks of ‘some people’ or a ‘large 
majority’, he seems to conceptualize this ‘corelessness’ not as a fundamental human 
condition but as an – albeit widespread – pathological syndrome.28 One may ask about 
the social conditions that contribute to this common phenomenon if a large majority of 
people, even though perhaps not all of them, can be considered coreless personalities.  
Schnitzler does not incidentally associate the lack of a ‘core’ with the performing arts. 
Being coreless has something to do with the talent of taking on different roles, of 
performatively adopting a personality rather than seeking ways of unmediated, authentic 
 
28 See Horst Thomé, ‘Kernlosigkeit und Pose Zur Rekonstruktion von Schnitzlers 
Psychologie’, in Fin de Siècle. Zur Naturwissenschaft und Literatur der 
Jahrhundertwende im deutsch-skandinavischen Kontext, ed. by Klaus Bohnen, Uffe 
Hansen, and Friedrich Schmöe (Kopenhagen and Munich, 1984), pp. 62–87 (p. 63). 
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expression. Thomé is right when he links this aspect of role-play to the performance of 
social roles: Schnitzler’s coreless personalities, one might say, are overwhelmed by their 
own protective Komödienspiel and unable to maintain their individual personal core apart 
from their public social role.29 
In Schnitzler’s literary writings, a too radical understanding of the cultivated detachment 
of social role-play appears to engender coreless personalities who suffer from a decisive 
lack of empathy and remain entrapped in the loneliness behind their own protective mask. 
Abigail Gillmann speaks of Schnitzler’s ‘aesthetics of detachment’, albeit only casually, 
in order to sketch out the un-empathetic personality of the protagonist in Der Weg ins 
Freie, 30 but it is a description that may well be applicable for the larger part of his work. 
The fear of personal exposure in a public space full of masked personas is pointedly 
played out in Schnitzler’s famous Traumnovelle (1925/26), when the protagonist 
experiences a profound sense of horror at the request to take off his mask at a masked 
ball: ‘Tausendmal schlimmer wäre es ihm erschienen, der einzige mit unverlarvtem 
 
29 The conflict between the individual and normalizing social forces as a central aspect of 
Schnitzler’s work has been widely recognised. See the overview by Wolfgang Lukas, 
‘Anthropologie und Lebensideologie’, in Arthur Schnitzler Handbuch: Leben – Werk – 
Wirkung, ed. by Christoph Jürgensen, Wolfgang Lukas, Matthias Scheffel (Stuttgart, 
2014), pp. 40–43 (p. 41).    
30 Abigail Gillman, ‘Failed Bildung and the Aesthetics of Detachment: Schnitzler’s Der 
Weg ins Freie’, in Confrontations/Accommodations: German-Jewish Literary and 
Cultural History from Heine to Wassermann, ed. by Mark Gelber, (Tübingen, 2004), pp. 
209–36. 
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Gesicht unter lauter Masken dazustehen, als plötzlich unter Angekleideten nackt’ [It 
would have seemed a thousand times worse to be the only one with his face not masked 
among so many masks, than to suddenly stand naked amongst people who were dressed] 
(E, 2, 468).  The passage can be read metaphorically as the need of modern subjects to 
participate in the social Komödienspiel in order to hide their vulnerability at all costs.31 
The consequences when this fear of embarrassing disclosure is carried from the public 
into the private sphere are paradigmatically played out in Schnitzler’s drama Der einsame 
Weg [The Lonely Road (1904)]. Notwithstanding the misogyny in Schnitzler’s aphorism, 
when he attributes a particular tendency for corelessness to female actors, the coreless 
personality affects both genders in this play, and men perhaps even more severely than 
women. In particular, the friendship between the painter Fichtner and the writer Stephan 
von Sala is decidedly defined rather by detached role-play than interpersonal 
connectedness. This is explicitly presented as a phenomenon of the twentieth century 
when Sala tells Fichtner: 
‘Wir bringen einander die Stichworte so geschickt – finden Sie nicht? Es 
gibt pathetische Leute, die solche Beziehungen Freundschaft nennen. 
Übrigens ist es nicht unmöglich, daß wir uns im vorigen Jahrhundert »du« 
gesagt, am Ende gar, daß Sie sich an meinem Busen ausgeweint hätten.’ 
 
31 See Julia Freytag, Verhüllte Schaulust: Die Maske in Schnitzlers Traumnovelle und in 
Kubricks Eyes Wide Shut (Bielefeld, 2007), p. 64, and Sibylle Saxer, Die Sprache der 
Blicke verstehen: Arthur Schnitzlers Poetik des Augen-Blicks als Poetik der Scham 
(Freiburg i.Br./Berlin/Vienna, 2010).  
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[We give each other our cues rather elegantly – don’t you think? There are 
certain emotional people who would call such relations a friendship. 
Incidentally, it is not impossible – had we lived in the previous century – 
that we would have been on a first-name footing, maybe even that you 
would have had a good cry on my breast.] (D, 1, 780)  
Direct demonstrations of intimate friendship are regarded as a relic of the last century, 
and intimacy can only be expressed through the ironic detour of referring mockingly to 
the past. Sala’s ironic distancing from more openly affectionate expressions of intimacy 
thus appears as a symptom of modernity – and it also seems to be inextricably linked to 
re-formulations of male identity constructions and modernist artistic styles. In the 
introduction to his study The Burdens of Intimacy: Psychoanalysis and Victorian 
Masculinity (1999), Christopher Lane explains that ‘several male modernists recoiled 
from the “taint” of Romantic and Pre-Raphaelite sensibility’.32 T.E. Hulme, for example, 
famously distanced himself from the alleged emotionalism of his literary predecessors 
such as Keats, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley and Swindburne. He warned writers of the 
poisonous, drug-like effects of Romanticism, while praising ‘the classical attitude’ for its 
‘holding back’.33 In opposition to the allegedly overly emotional, effeminate man of the 
previous century, the man of the twentieth century avows a modern form of reserved, 
cool, and detached masculinity. With the representation of artistic characters who comply 
with these conduct codes that regulate the interpersonal interaction and ensure a smooth 
 
32 Christopher Lane, The Burdens of Intimacy: Psychoanalysis & Victorian Masculinity 
(Chicago/London, 1999), p. 39. 
33 Ibid., p. 40.  
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performance of the masculine ideal, Schnitzler’s text places itself firmly within the 
modernism of the twentieth century. However, the fact that these characters are 
essentially drawn as ‘coreless’ personalities suffering from loneliness as well as a lack of 
empathy suggests that Schnitzler also critically anticipates the problematic consequences 
of the anthropology of detachment emerging in the interwar years. Loneliness is directly 
linked to the inability of the characters to form or maintain interpersonal connections and 
becomes contextualized as a time-specific diagnosis of an ‘Epochenkrankheit’ [illness of 
the era].34 The play, which Schnitzler called in earlier drafts ‘Egoisten’ [Egoists] and 
‘Junggesellen’ [Bachelors],35 has been read as a ‘Drama der Beziehungsschwäche’ 
[drama of weakness in relationships] that not only criticizes aestheticism as a decadent art 
form, but also the decadent bourgeois life-style concepts of the turn of the century that it 
informs.36 
The kinship to Plessner’s conduct codes of detached social role-play is highlighted by the 
fact that Sala uses a theatrical metaphor (‘Stichworte’/cues) to describe his relationship 
with Fichtner. Friendship is thereby reduced to a witty performance of social role-play 
that makes any attempt at intimacy impossible. Two implicit references to both Plessner 
 
34 Alfred Doppler, ‘“Der Ästhet als Bösewicht – ?” (Schnitzlers Schauspiel Der einsame 
Weg), MAL 12.1 (1979), 1–18 (p. 16). 
35 See Michael Titzmann, ‘Der einsame Weg’, in Schnitzler Handbuch: Leben – Werk – 
Wirkung, ed. by Christoph Jürgensen, Wolfgang Lukas, Michael Scheffel (Stuttgart, 
2014), pp. 75–79 (p. 75). 
36 Jochen Schmidt, ‘Der einsame Weg’, in Arthur Schnitzler: Dramen und Erzählungen, 
ed. by Hee-Ju Kim and Günter Saße (Stuttgart, 2007), p. 118. 
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and Lethen in a review of Christian Petzold’s 2010 production of Schnitzler’s play 
support this interpretation:  bringing to mind Plessner’s armoured persona in the public 
sphere, the journalist Christoph Schmidt writes in the Süddeutsche Zeitung: ‘Jeder scheint 
hier in sich selbst gefangen und wird nur laut wie in einem Lagerkoller, um gegen die 
eigene Panzerung zu trommeln’ [Everybody here seems to be imprisoned within 
themselves and only shout out as if in cabin fever to drum against their own armour].37 
And he summarizes the experience of watching the play as an evening dominated by the 
codes of cool conduct. Indeed, Schnitzler’s characters in Der einsame Weg seem to be so 
detached from their own emotional and personal ‘core’, so to speak, that they display an 
‘internal inability to cohere’. 38   
At the end of the play, Sala has to pay the price for his radical adoption of detached 
conduct codes: when he is confronted with the diagnosis of terminal illness, it becomes 
impossible for him to maintain his cultivated mask of indifference. Consequently, he 
chooses to end his life immediately: ‘Sie denken doch nicht, ich werde warten? Das fänd' 
ich ein wenig peinlich. Zu Julian, lachend. Wer wird Ihnen jetzt die Stichworte bringen, 
lieber Freund?’ [You don’t think I’ll wait? That I would find a bit embarrassing. 
Laughing, to Julian. Who will give you your cues now, dear friend?] (D, 1, 835). In order 
 
37 Christoph Schmidt, ‘Distanz der Vampire: Christian Petzold inszeniert Schnitzlers 
“Einsamen Weg” als Gespensterreigen in Berlin’, Süddeutsche Zeitung: sz.de (17 May 
2010) (https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/christian-petzold-als-theaterregisseur-distanz-
der-vampire-1.387801, accessed 28 November 2018). 
38 Lane, The Burdens of Intimacy, p. 2.  
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to avoid embarrassment and vulnerability Sala chooses to keep up his ironic role-play.39 
His fear of embarrassment certainly resonates with Plessner’s conception of the ‘risk of 
ridicule’. While Schnitzler entertained ideas sympathetic to Plessner’s hope to contain 
aggressive tendencies by avoiding embarrassing exposure through cultivated detachment, 
his play shows that the compulsive need to protect one’s personal ‘core’ from exposure 
by masking it through social role-play may contain the risk of becoming completely 
‘coreless’ and therefore unable to connect with others or feel empathy for them.  
In another aphorism, written during WWI, Schnitzler invokes Darwin when he reflects on 
an extreme form of detachment, that is the indifference to the suffering of others, which 
he understands as a more problematic aspect of human nature than the tendency to 
aggression or cruelty: ‘Diese Gleichgültigkeit hat sich wahrscheinlich im Kampf ums 
Dasein entwickelt, da nur durch sie das Leben, das Weiterleben überhaupt möglich 
wurde’ [This indifference was probably developed in the struggle for existence, because 
only through this was it at all possible to live, to survive] (AB, 212). Schnitzler was 
forced to adopt his own posture of detachment in order to defend his place in the literary 
field in particular and in the Austrian society in general. The passage in Der Weg ins 
Freie gives insight into how this posture of detachment, forced upon the marginalized 
individual as the expression of anger, is met with further marginalization. In the passage 
about Berthold, this further injustice is created by the inability and unwillingness of the 
people around him to accept his anger, let alone join him in it – people who are 
 
39 In Thomé’s reading of Schnitzler’s novella Das Spiel im Morgengrauen [Gambling at 
Dawn], he comes to a similar conclusion about the connection between compulsive social 
role-play and the protagonist’s suicide. See Thomé, ‘Kernlosigkeit und Pose’.  
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supposedly at least sympathetic to his criticism of antisemitic injustice. It is their 
detached lack of solidarity that enforces Berthold’s detachment.40 It is here that 
Schnitzler’s work addresses an aspect that will be neglected by Plessner: the fact that 
cultivated indifference, even when softened by tactful politeness, will reinforce forms of 
social and political oppression.  
Plessner’s study was written against new forms of radicalism on both the right and the 
left wing of politics. The tactful cultivation of distance, he hoped, would prevent the 
formation of totalitarian discourses of community. However, when cool detachment 
becomes necessary for survival, it creates a ‘moment when all is lost except attitude [or: 
posture – ‘Haltung’, M.K.]’.41 At such a moment, individuals will experience not just 
loneliness but an all-encompassing sense of abandonment that, according to Hannah 
Arendt, paves the way for totalitarian regimes to take hold.42 This danger is already 
expressed in Der einsame Weg when Sala’s parting words seem to entail a pre-fascist 
anticipation of precisely such a moment: ‘Es scheint mir überhaupt, daß jetzt wieder ein 
besseres Geschlecht heranwächst, – mehr Haltung und weniger Geist’ [It generally seems 
to me that a better generation is now set to come of age once more – more 
posture/bearing and less spirit] (D, 1, 835–36). Twenty years before Plessner’s study was 
 
40  This remains an important aspect of discussions on the politics of emotions today. See 
Amia Srinivasan, ‘The Aptness of Anger’, Journal of Political Philosophy 26.2 (2018), 
123–144 (p. 127). 
41 Lethen, Cool Conduct, p. 216.  
42 See Hannah Arendt, Elemente totaler Herrschaft (Frankfurt a.M., 1956), p. 277. See 
also Lethen, Cool Conduct, p. 216. 
 29 
published, Schnitzler’s play therefore seems critically to anticipate the radicalization of 
its claims. 
